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Abstract
Cryptanalysis is the science of studying given encryption algorithms or any other cryp-
tographic related mechanism in order to identify potential flaws or vulnerabilities either in
the implementation and the environment or in the mathematics that underline the mathe-
matical algorithms used. Such flaws can be used in order to dispute the level of security
that the mechanism is claimed to offer and it is very important if we always enhance existing
techniques.
One of the most important and powerful techniques in the area of symmetric cryptanalysis
is the technique of Differential Cryptanalysis (DC). DC can be applied primarily to block
ciphers but also to some extend to stream ciphers and cryptographic hash functions. Its
discovery was attributed to Eli Biham and Adi Shamir in the late 1980s [2, 3], but according
to Don Coppersmith this technique was already known to IBM and NSA as early as 1974 [1].
However, they decided to keep confidential the description of such powerful attack since it
would be possibly able of breaking many block ciphers or other cryptography standards used
in many applications.
The main task in DC is to study the propagation of certain input differences through
different number of rounds and identify some input-output pairs of differences which propagate
with comparatively good probability, compared to what expected in the case of a random
permutation. This non-random behavior of the cipher for reduced number of rounds can
sometimes be extended to a key recovery attack. Several enhancements were proposed to
naive DC such as boomerang attack, impossible differentials and more importantly truncated
differentials as proposed by Knudsen [6, 7]. In truncated differentials, an attacker studies the
propagation of sets of differences instead of single differences. The problem in attacks involving
truncated differentials is the study of the exponentially large space of differentials. Some ad-
hoc heuristics of the cipher can be used to speedup the process. For example, Courtois and
Mourouzis have suggested such heuristics in case of GOST block cipher which can be used
in order to construct reduced round distinguishers for up to 20 rounds [8, 9]. In addition, a
framework for extending a distinguisher to a possibly efficiently good key recovery attack is
described in details in [10].
In addition to DC, we have plenty of other cryptanalytic techniques such as Linear Crypt-
analysis [4, 5], Algebraic Attacks [11] and more recently Rotational Cryptanalysis by Khovra-
tovich [13]. In linear cryptanalysis, the attacker constructs linear equations involving plaintext,
ciphertext and key bits for a certain number of rounds which can be used to extend to an at-
tack against the full cipher. In algebraic attacks, an attacker tries to encode algebraically
all cipher’s operations and then using limited data such as known plaintext-ciphertext pairs
tries to solve the underlying system of equations and derive some key bits. After deriving the
algebraic encoding of the given cryptographic primitive, then ready open-source software can
be used to derive the key in an automated way such as SAT solver.
In the other framework, that of rotational cryptanalysis, the attacker observes the propa-
gation of pairs of inputs or intermediate states, which have some rotational symmetry towards
different number of rounds. What we end up is a distinguisher in the related-key setting, since
here the assumption of stochastic equivalence is not guaranteed as in case of DC. Such attacks
are applicable to the ARX ciphers which are ciphers widely used in lightweight cryptogra-
phy since they have very cheap implementation cost and they involve only three operations;
modular additions, rotations and XOR gates [13].
All these attacks have been studied for many years and many advancements have been
made. Many cryptographers combined such techniques in a cryptanalytic framework for con-
structing more efficient techniques. For example, we have algebraic-linear attacks, where linear
equations hold with sufficiently high probability and added to the algebraic description of the
cipher, increasing in this way the probability of being able to solve the underlying system.
Albrecht in his PhD thesis suggested a cryptanalytic framework of combining algebraic at-
tacks with differential attacks [12] and recently Mourouzis in his PhD thesis suggested an
enhancements of algebraic attacks using truncated differentials [10].
In this report, we suggest a new cryptanalytic framework of constructing distinguishers
which can be eventually extended to full attacks in the related-key scenario. We name this
new paradigm as ”Relational Cryptanalysis”. The main idea is to exhibit the non-randomness
of a given encryption algorithm by observing the propagation of specific sets of plaintexts of
the form (P, P ′) such that these pairs satisfy some rotational and differential properties of
the form R1(P ) = P
′ and P ⊕ P ′ ∈ ∆P , for some rotational symmetry R1 and fixed set of
differences ∆P . Except of rotational and differential properties, we can add any other relation
which seems to hold for a reduced number of rounds of the cryptographic primitive we study.
Intuitively, we expect that by adding more relations we increase the observed probability of
the propagation and this result to stronger statistical distinguishers.
The main idea behind our statistical distinguishers is to define two sets of relations A =
{RI1, RI2, ..., RIn} and B = {RO1, RO2, ..., ROm}, for some relations RIi, ROj and some
integers n,m and then count the number of expected plaintext pairs (Pi, Pj) which are related
by relations from the set A and lead to ciphertext pairs (Ci, Cj) which are related by relations
from set B after some rounds r. For example, one relation RIi may denote a specific difference
or a set of differences as in truncated differentials, or a rotational symmetry of the pair of
plaintexts by a fixed number of shifts or any other relation we can find based on the structure
of the encryption algorithm.
We count this number by simulations over random plaintexts and keys and by repeating
this procedure and considering the average number of these pairs we expect that these events
are described by some Gaussian distribution with the mean and standard deviation computed
after running many simulations until the limit of the probability is obtained. This is essentially
a simple application of the Central Limit Theorem. Thus, it is a non-trivial optimization steps
to find the best possible input-output relations which result in comparatively good probabilities
of the propagation we study. For each encryption standard we need to derive some ad-hoc
heuristics derived from the specific structure in order to have a speed-up in this procedure.
We formalize this new framework inspired from the work of Courtois and Mourouzis for
constructing statistical distinguishers based on truncated differentials for GOST block cipher
and some of its variants [8, 9]. As a proof of concept, we apply this combined framework
using simple toy example ciphers and show that this combination leads to stronger statistical
distinguishers. In addition, we discuss how this technique can be used in cryptanalysis of
hash functions since the attack has full control over the key and thus working in a related-key
scenario makes more sense.
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